Recently, the SEC effectively expanded the communication channels available for management by determining that social media is an acceptable channel for financial disclosures.
Introduction
Assessing investors' reactions to voluntary financial disclosures has been the focus of a long stream of accounting research. Research has analyzed investors reactions to news in many areas, including their reactions to earnings per share disclosures (Skinner [1994] ); earnings per share forecasts (Kothari et al. [2009] ); readability of the disclosure (Rennekamp [2012] ); and the creditability of the information source (Clement and Tse [2003] ). While the research has been extensive, the use of social media as a disclosure channel and investors' reactions to the disclosed news has not been examined. This paper expands the literature on investors' reactions to voluntary disclosures by examining investors' reactions to news disclosed via social media and to the comments that may be attached to the disclosed news. The results indicate that the investors' perceptions concerning the valence of the news and their valuation judgments were influenced by the attached comments. In keeping with Kothari, Wysocki and Shu [2009] and Skinner [1994] , the reactions to the news were asymmetrical when no comments were attached to the news. However, contrary to prior research, when comments were attached to the disclosures, the reactions to the news were symmetrical and in certain cases the bad news disclosures were perceived to be good news.
The results lead to a call for the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to revisit the regulation allowing for social media as a disclosure channel for financial information.
On April 2, 2013 the SEC issued a Report of Investigation regarding the investigation of
Reed Hastings and Netflix, Inc. (SEC [2013] ). The report was in response to an SEC investigation into Mr. Hastings' financial disclosure concerning Netflix, Inc. on his personal Facebook page. The report provides additional guidance regarding Regulation FD (Reg FD) (SEC [2000] ) and company websites (SEC [2008] ), by acknowledging that social media is an acceptable channel for financial disclosures (SEC [2013] ).
While adoption of this disclosure method has been slow, companies are beginning to take advantage of social media as a disclosure channel. A major difference exists in the channels, which can lead to social media as a disclosure channel being used by management to manipulate naïve investors' perception of the valence of the disclosure in a manner that is beyond the scope and protection of the regulation.
The difference and possible danger that is inherent with social media as a disclosure channel lies in the nature of the communication. The disclosure channels of press releases and company websites have two main things in common: (1) they are one-way communication channels and (2) the company controls the communication. Social media, is a three-way communication channel where all parties have the ability to participate in the conversation and management has the ability to manipulate the conversation. Further, in social media there is the potential for private or personal communication rather than only entity communication.
Management has been shown to manipulate the conversation in conference calls by not responding to questions from some participants (Hollander et al. [2010] ) and by deception (Larcker and Zakolyukina [2012] ). With conference calls, even though management can refuse to respond to questions and can present information in a deceptive manner (Larcker and Zakolyukina [2012] ), management can only control one side of the conversation and the other side is still heard by the other participants. With social media this is not the case.
When social media is used for disclosures, all parties have the ability to add to the conversation, but the company ultimately has the ability to effectively control all sides of the conversation. In the social media version of three-way communication, the company communicates, via posts or tweets, the disclosed news to the investor; individual investors communicate their views of the information to the company via comments attached to the posts; and the investors' comments are also communicated to other investors. Management can manipulate this conversation by framing information deceptively and, unique to the social media channel, can delete the comments of other participants so that only comments that portray the disclosed news in a favorable manner are available to investors. Other factors that make the comments possibly harmful to investors are that they may be from sources that lack the knowledge and credibility necessary to make accurate comments regarding the valence of the news (e.g., good news or bad news); there may be a large number of comments; and people are often swayed by the views of others, regardless of the credibility of the communicator. It is the comments attached to the disclosures that are possibly harmful to investors and that are beyond the scope of the guidance from the SEC.
In order to make their investment decisions, investors primarily rely on information provided by the companies in which they invest (Clor-Proell [2009 ], Pinsker [2011 ) and they react to the disclosed news asymmetrically, with stronger reactions to bad news (Kothari, Wysocki and Shu [2009], Skinner [1994] ). The rapid dissemination of this financial information is demanded by investors (Ettredge et al. [2002] ). Further, companies primarily release good news in a timely manner and delay the release of bad news (Kothari, Wysocki and Shu [2009] ).
Since investors have the ability to trade on the disclosure almost instantaneously, rapid dissemination can be advantageous for companies and their investors as the news may have a rapid and favorable effect on stock price.
Social media allows companies to reap the full benefit of rapid dissemination as news is disseminated more quickly via social media than via traditional disclosure channels (Doer et al. [2012] ). When Reed Hastings made his post that set off the investigation by the SEC in 2012, Netflix' stock price rose approximately 16% within 1.5 days. However, this is a double-edged sword for investors, as investors also receive rapid dissemination of the comments of other investors regarding the companies' posts and tweets. These comments may have an effect on the investors' perceptions of the valence of the news and their decision-making that is more extreme or in the opposite direction of the actual news.
While Reg FD effectively lessened the asymmetry between investors' reactions to good and bad news disclosures, social media as a disclosure channel, through the attached comments, makes it possible for this asymmetry to be exacerbated. And, in the specific case of bad news with all attached comments being positive, the asymmetry in the investors' reactions to the news may be eliminated. Furthermore, as investors comment on the companies posted disclosures, the perception of individual investors regarding the disclosure may be altered via the majority influence effect of herding (Muchnik et al. [2013] ), which, as explained by the spiral of silence (Neuwirth and Frederick [2004] ), is intensified due to minority opinions being silenced. This paper experimentally tests theses assertions.
Phase 1 of the experiment was used to determine what investors felt was good news and bad news in a disclosure of listener hours for a fictitious online streaming music company. 91 participants provided their perception of the valence of the news and provided brief comments explaining the rationale behind their perception. Phase 1 yielded the number of listener hours and selected comments used in the instrument for Phase 2.
In Phase 2, a web-based experiment was used to test the hypotheses regarding whether the comments attached to financial disclosures via social media affected investors' perceptions regarding the disclosure and their reaction to the disclosures. A 2x4 experimental design was used in which the valence of the news between good news and bad news and for the disclosure to have all positive comments, all negative comments, a mix of comments that approximates neutrality in the comments, and no comments, were manipulated. The participants responded to several dependent variable questions regarding their perceived valence of the news, common stock valuation judgments, and management credibility.
The results showed that investors' perceptions of the valence of the disclosed news via social media were influenced by comments attached to the post. The main effects of the news and disclosure groups were significant, as well as several pair-wise comparisons across comment groups being significantly different. Of particular interest is that when all positive comments were attached to bad news, the news was considered by the participants to be good news, with the perception of the news being greater than all other bad news comment groups and greater than some of the good news comment groups.
The results reveal that attached comments significantly influence investors' stock valuation judgments. Consistent with prior research (Kothari, Wysocki and Shu [2009], Skinner [1994] ), when no comments were attached to the disclosures the reactions were asymmetrical, with stronger reactions to bad news. However, when comments were attached to the disclosures, the reactions were contrary to prior research and no significant differences existed between the participants' reactions to good news or bad news.
The testing of investors' perceptions on management credibility yielded results that show that management was deemed to be more credible when good news was disclosed. Also, when all positive comments were attached to a disclosure of bad news the perception of management's credibility was significantly higher than when all negative comments were attached.
The study contributes to the voluntary disclosure literature by analyzing investment decisions and perceptions of disclosures via social media in a situation where investors' views of the disclosure are directly attached via comments to management's disclosures, which is unique to the social media disclosure channel. The findings also contribute to practice by providing evidence that may call into question the legitimacy of social media as a disclosure channel.
Section 2 contains a discussion of the context of the research and development of the hypotheses. Section 3 presents the research method. The results are discussed in Section 4. The paper concludes in Section 5.
Research Context and Hypotheses

The Effect of Herding and Majority Opinion on Investors
Herding has been shown to have an effect on analysts' forecasts. Hong et al. [2000] found that inexperienced analysts are more likely to release earnings forecasts that are closer to the median forecast of other analysts. Analysts have also been shown to be more likely to herd if they self-asses their forecasting ability to be low (Clement and Tse [2005] , Scharfstein and Stein [1990] , Trueman [1994] ). Gleason and Lee [2003] suggest that uninformed analysts make small revisions to their initial forecasts and herd. If analysts herd in their forecasts and forecast revisions, one can infer that naïve investors would be more susceptible to the opinions of others and would herd with regards to their perception of disclosed news and their valuation judgments.
Investors that rely on social media for investment news can be expected to be naïve and uninformed investors. And social media users have been shown to be subject to herding effects.
In social media when an individual views a positively rated news, the herding effect proposes that they will likewise rate the news positively (Muchnik, Aral and Taylor [2013] ). This was found to be the case for positive ratings, but not for negative ratings, even if the positive rating was provided 'incorrectly'. However, when a negative rating was provided incorrectly, a correction effect occurred where individuals were more likely to correct a negative ranking with a positive ranking than to concur with the ranking and likewise negatively rank a post. The herding effect has also shown that predictions about future investment decisions are influenced by prior correct recommendations, regardless of whether a new prediction is well founded (Andersson et al. [2009] ).
Majority opinion is another closely related concept that can expand the understanding provided by herding theory. Research has shown that if a majority opinion exists, the majority of other individuals will go along with that opinion. This has been shown in research related to group decision support systems with the input a person would provide in a group setting (Zhang et al. [2007] ). If the majority of a group agree on a given set of information, it is less likely that a group member will offer a contrary opinion.
Similarly, Akerlof [1970] suggests that naive investors in the used car market do not have ability to discern "lemons" from good cars based on the biased information which they receive.
Due to the majority influence provided by comments on a financial disclosure via social media, the naïve investor will likely have a difficult time determining good investments from "lemons".
The Effect of the Spiral of Silence on Investors
The effect of herding and majority opinion are exacerbated by the spiral of silence, which supports the concept that when an opinion is expressed and supported by the majority, minority opinions are less likely to be expressed (Neuwirth and Frederick [2004] ). These findings suggest that when individuals are overwhelmed with a majority opinion that contradicts their opinion, they cope with the situation and move on, without sharing their viewpoints.
McLeod et al. [1997] showed that as individuals rely on computer-mediated communication (rather than face-to-face) minority comments had a much more difficult time in improving the group investment decision quality when the majority disagreed. In particular, computer-mediated communication allows the minority opinion to comment, but reduces the influence of their comments as compared to the majority opinion. When it comes to comments on social media posts, individuals will have opportunities to present dissenting opinions in the comments section, giving them a voice. However, if the dissenting opinion is in the minority as compared to the majority opinion the investment decision will likely be made in line with the majority opinion.
Drawing upon the spiral of science (Neuwirth and Frederick [2004] ) and majority opinion (Zhang, Lowry, Zhou and Fu [2007] ), research has shown that the majority opinion will also affect decision-making. In an investment setting, when individuals with a minority dissenting opinion are given the opportunity to continue investing resources into a failing endeavor with substantial sunk costs, a strong majority opinion by those wanting to continue investing will outweigh the opinion of a dissenting rational individual (Smith et al. [1998] ). Thus, it is expected that a person's opinion of a financial disclosure will be influenced to match the majority opinion.
The participants in Phase 2 of the experiment receive good or bad news disclosures that were hypothetically disseminated via social media. The disclosures have (1) all positive comments, (2) all negative comments, (3) a mix of positive and negative comments, or (4) no comments attached. It is hypothesized that the comments will influence the participants' perception of the valence of the news and the valuation judgments. The following hypotheses formally state the expectations:
H1.
Investors receiving good (bad) news via social media channels will perceive the news to be less positive (negative) if all of the comments are negative (positive).
H2.
Investors' changes in valuation judgment will be less positive (negative) when receiving good (bad) news via social media channels if all of the comments are negative (positive).
Of particular interest is the case where bad news is disclosed about a company via social media and all of the attached comments are positive. In this case, it is likely that individual's perception of the bad news will be less negative than when only negative comments (i.e, in line with the bad news) are attached and when no comments are attached. The valence of the bad news may even be changed to good news when only positive comments are attached. This would result in the asymmetry in the investors' reactions to good and bad news being eliminated.
Formally stated,
H3.
The asymmetry between the reactions to the good and bad news will be eliminated when all of the comments are positive.
The amount and valence of the comments attached to disclosures disseminated via social media may also influence investors' perceptions of the credibility of the disclosing organization's management. Investors perceive management that is more forthcoming and accurate in their disclosures to be more credible (Koonce and Lipe [2010] , Mercer [2005] ). Thus, one can infer from this that as more people provide evidence, via comments that are consistent with the valence of the disclosures, investors would perceive management to be more credible.
Research also shows that when disclosure accuracy is low, investors perceive management as less credible (Mercer [2005] , Tan et al. [2002] ). Therefore, when there are comments attached to the disclosures that are contrary to the valence of the disclosure, investors may perceive management as less credible. Thus:
H4.
Investors receiving good (bad) news will perceive management as less (more) credible if all of the comments are negative (positive).
Method
Participants
Participants 1 for both phases of the experiment were recruited from Amazon's Mechanical Turk platform (AMT) 2 . AMT is an online market for researchers to obtain paid participants to participate in cognitive tasks, such as taking online surveys and participating in online experiments (Brandon et al. [2013] , Rennekamp [2012] ). Participants obtained via AMT have been successfully used by accounting researchers (Rennekamp [2012] , van der Heiden [2013] ).
Phase 1 of the experiment included 114 initial observations. Fifteen observations were removed due to failed manipulation checks, three were removed for unrealistic answers to years of work experience, and five were removed for unreasonable answers to other items. Thus, 91
observations were used in Phase 1.
Observations for Phase 2 of the experiment were obtained from 338 participants. 61 observations were removed for failed manipulation and/or attentiveness checks, three were removed for invalid answers, and 43 were removed for not being Facebook users. Therefore, the data set for Phase 2 contained 231 observations. Overall, 61.2% (38.8%) of the participants were male (female). On average the participants were 30.68 years old with 11.63 years of work experience. The participants had completed an average of 1.22 accounting courses and 1.09 finance courses. For Phase 2 of the study, the 231 participants access their Facebook page an average of 5 days per week.
Expert Panel
Four accounting and two finance researchers analyzed the experimental materials for both phases of the study and the same four accounting researchers analyzed the comments during 1Participants were required to be residents of the United States of America and at least eighteen years of age. 2 Participants in Phase 1 were paid $0.25 for their participation, while Phase 2 participants were paid $0.75. The difference in compensation was due to the increased time required to complete Phase 2.
Phase 1. They provided guidance on the instrument development, concluded that the valence of the manipulated news was indeed "good" and "bad", and that the comments obtained in Phase 1
were both positive and negative. Furthermore, they concluded that the instrument was valid and realistic.
Design
The experiment used a 2x4 between-subjects design where the disclosure of private corporate information of a fictitious music streaming company via a social media disclosure channel and the comments attached to the disclosure were manipulated (see Figure 1 : Panel A). As discussed earlier, the experiment was conducted in two phases. In Phase 1, the participants received a scenario in which a fictitious company disclosed new private financial information via an online social network. The participants were asked a number of questions concerning the disclosure, in order to determine the valence of the disclosed news and to elicit comments concerning the news that could be used as comments that would be attached to the disclosures in Phase 2. In Phase 2, the participants received the same scenario as in Phase 1, but with the good and bad news and the type of attached comments being manipulated. This phase was used to obtain data that was used to test the hypotheses. 
Manipulations
The experimental scenario was that of a fictitious Internet streaming music service. This industry was selected to be in a similar industry as Netflix, in order to allow for a disclosure that was similar to the disclosure from the Netflix CEO that led to the change in the regulation. The data was based upon that of Pandora Media, Inc. 3 , but was consistently changed by a given percentage, so as to make the numbers more comprehendible for the participants and to disguise the identity of the actual company. The background information for the company was constant throughout the experiment. The manipulations related to the number of listener hours disclosed by the company and the comments attached to the post containing the disclosure. Appendix A contains the experimental materials for both phases of the experiment.
In Phase 1, the number of disclosed listener hours ranged from 300 to 900 hours, in 100-hour increments. In Phase 2, the listener hours were manipulated as either 300 hours or 500 hours.
The choice of 300 or 500 hours was determined from the results of Phase 1 and is discussed in the next subsection. Both number of listener hours showed an increase from the previous year, but 300 hours was such a small increase that the Phase 1 participants considered it bad news. 500
listener hours was considered a substantial increase from the previous year and as good news by these participants.
The comments attached to the posted disclosure were manipulated as all positive comments, all negative comments, a mixture of positive and negative comments, or no comments. The comments used in Phase 2 were chosen from those provided by the Phase 1 participants. The comments were slightly altered to make them appear to be legitimate Facebook posts.
Task and Procedures
Phase 1 of the study was conducted to determine the number of listener hours and the comments to be used in the financial disclosure for Phase 2. The participants in Phase 1 were provided a scenario containing the background information for the fictitious company. Following the background information was a disclosure of the number of listener hours the company provided in the previous calendar year. The number of listener hours randomly varied from 300
to 900 hours in 100-hour increments. The participants were asked to provide their perception of the news on a 101-point scale ranging from 0 (very bad news) to 100 (very good news). They were then asked to provide a short (less than 100 words) comment on why they perceived the news as they did in the previous question. The participants also answered manipulation and attentiveness check questions, questions regarding realism of the scenario, and demographic questions.
The Phase 1 results were analyzed to determine the number of listener hours that represented good and bad news to the participants. Also, the comments from the participants were analyzed and a set of 14 comments were selected that provided a clear rationale for why the participants believed the news to be good or bad. The selected comments were altered to make them appear as legitimate short Facebook posts. The experts concluded that the selection of 300 and 500 listener hours were indeed bad and good news. They also categorized the set of selected and altered comments and unanimously agreed on a final set of 7 positive and 7 negative comments.
Obtaining the manipulations from actual participants provided the scenario with validity and realism that would otherwise have been difficult to obtain.
Based upon the information from Phase I, an instrument was developed that was pretested on a sample of 159 undergraduate students. They also offered suggestions to make the instrument clearer. After evaluating the comments the instrument was modified. Analysis of the pretest results indicated that the manipulations were understandable and that the instrument would yield usable observations for hypothesis testing.
In Phase 2, the participants received the background scenario for the fictitious company, after which they were asked to provide an initial common stock valuation for the company.
Following their initial evaluation, the participants received a financial disclosure that was designed to resemble a Facebook post and were told that the company's CEO posted the disclosure on the company's online social media site. The post had comments randomly attached to it in one of the following conditions: all positive comments, all negative comments, a mix of positive and negative comments, or no comments. The participants then provided a second common stock valuation for the company, indicated their perception of the news, and provided their perception on the credibility of management. Manipulation and attentiveness check questions and demographic questions concluded Phase 2.
Dependent Variables
Several dependent variables will be used to test the hypotheses. In keeping with prior research, perception of the news, valuation judgments, and perceptions of management's credibility were measured (Koonce and Lipe [2010] , Rennekamp [2012] ).
After receiving the disclosure, the participants were asked if they perceived the disclosure as being good news or bad news, which assessed whether they perceived the comments as adding to or changing the valence of the news. The responses were captured by asking the participants to indicate their perception of the news on a 101-point scale ranging from 0 = "very bad news" to 100 = "very good news."
The participants were asked, both before and after receiving the disclosure, to indicate on a 101-point scale, a valuation of the common stock of the organization. The scale ranges from 0 = "low" and 100 = "high." The difference between (change in) the two measures is the dependent variable and captures the participants' reactions to the disclosure and comments.
( Koonce and Lipe [2010] , Rennekamp [2012] ).
Taking the average of management's perceived trustworthiness and competence created the perception of management's credibility construct. Participants were asked, after receiving the disclosure, to indicate on separate 101-point scales the trustworthiness of management and the competence of management. The trustworthiness scale ranged from 0 = "very untrustworthy" to 100 = "very trustworthy." The competence scale ranged from 0 = "very incompetent" to 100 = "very competent" (Koonce and Lipe [2010] , Rennekamp [2012] ).
Results
Phase 1
Phase 1 of the study was used to determine what level of disclosed listener hours the participants perceived to be good news and bad news and subsequently used in Phase 2 as the number of listener hours in the disclosure. Also, Phase 1 was used to collect actual comments from the participants that would be used in Phase 2 as the comments that would be attached to the disclosure.
As seen in Table 1 
01). Analysis of the means from
Panel A showed a large increase in perception of the news for listener hours between 400 and 500, showing that to be the most likely cutoff between good news and bad news. This cutoff was supported by the comments from the participants on why they perceived the news as they did.
Pair-wise comparisons showed that significant differences existed between 300 and 500 listener hours (p < 0.01) and between 400 and 500 listener hours (p < 0.01). However, the difference between 300 and 400 listener hours was insignificant (p = 0.50). Therefore, 300 and 500 listener hours were selected as the bad and good news, respectively, for the disclosure in Phase 2.
14 of the provided comments (7 positive and 7 negative) that succinctly and clearly stated the participants' rational for the perception of the news were selected and slightly altered to resemble comments on Facebook. These comments were given to the four accounting professors, who are social media users, who classified them as positive and negative comments. Their classifications were in line with the participants'. These comments were used in Phase 2 as the attached comments.
***** Insert Table 1 Approximately Here *****
Effect of the Comments on Perception of the News
The expectation for H1 is that investors receiving good (bad) news via social media channels will perceive the news to be less positive (negative) if all of the comments are negative (positive). Descriptive statistics for the changes in valuation are presented in Table 2 ***** Insert Table 2 Approximately Here ***** ***** Insert Figure 2 Approximately Here *****
Effects of the comments on Changes in Valuation
Hypothesis 2 predicts that changes in the valuations will be less positive (negative) when receiving good (bad) news via social media channels if all of the comments are negative (positive). The ANOVA results, as presented in Table 3 and Figure 4 , show that the main effects of news (F = 37.945; p < 0.01), comments (F = 10.526; p < 0.01), and the interaction (F = 5.249; p < 0.01) are significant. Hence, valuation changes for all the good news comment groups are more positive than those for all respective bad news comment groups.
Pair-wise comparison analysis indicates that H2 is partially supported. When the news was bad, the all positive comments group significantly lessened the participants' reactions to the news (as evidenced by the average change of the participants' valuations from their initial valuation to their post-disclosure valuation) over the all negative comments group (p < 0.01) and the no comments group (p = 0.01), but was not to a level different from the mixed comment group.
On the other hand, when the news was good, the comments did not have a significant effect on the change in the valuation, except for the pairwise. When the news is good and the comments are all positive as opposed to all negative, the difference is approaching significance (p = 0.07).
The results of the testing of the difference between the reaction of the investors to good and bad news supported H3. Evaluation of the pair-wise comparisons between the like-kind comment groups for good and bad news (see bottom four rows of Table 3 : Panel C) show that the asymmetry purported by Kothari, Wysocki and Shu [2009] and Skinner [1994] does exist when no comments are attached to the disclosures (p < 0.01) and the reaction to the bad news was greater than the reaction to the good news. However, contrary to prior research, when comments were attached to the disclosures the asymmetry was eliminated for all of the comment group pairs. The pair-wise differences were insignificant for the reactions between the all positive (p = 0.87), all negative (p = 0.19), and mixed (p = 0.48) comment groups. ***** Insert Table 3 Approximately Here ***** ***** Insert Figure 3 Approximately Here *****
Effect of comments on Management Credibility
As discussed previously, the construct of credibility was created to test Hypothesis 4 (investors' perception of managements' credibility). The measures for trustworthiness and competence were averaged to yield the credibility construct (Rennekamp [2012] ). Cronbach's alpha for the credibility construct equals 0.85, which exceeds the 0.70 threshold (Nunnally [1978] ), confirming that the construct is reliable. Therefore, H4 is partially supported. ***** Insert Table 4 Approximately Here ***** ***** Insert Figure 4 Approximately Here *****
Conclusion
Research has shown that in making investment decisions, investors rely on news provided by the companies in which they invest (Clor-Proell [2009 ], Pinsker [2011 ) and they react to the disclosed news asymmetrically, with stronger reactions to bad news (Kothari, Wysocki and Shu [2009], Skinner [1994] ). Not only does the disclosed news influence the investors, but so does the readability of the news (Rennekamp [2012] ). The current study extends prior research on valuation judgments and financial disclosure using a controlled experiment to determine if comments attached to news disclosed with financial information via social media influences the investors' perceptions of the disclosed news, their valuation judgments, and their perceptions of management's credibility. The research on the asymmetry in investors' reactions to disclosed news is also extended.
The study finds that investors are, in fact, influenced by comments attached to financial disclosures via social media. In keeping with prior research on herding and social media (Muchnik, Aral and Taylor [2013] ), investors are also influenced by majority opinions delivered via social media comments. When investors received all positive comments attached to both good and bad news, their perception of the valence of the news was significantly more positive than when the comments were all negative and when no comments were attached. The effect is most noteworthy in the case where bad news is disclosed and all positive comments were attached to the post. In this case, the valence of the news was changed with the bad news being perceived as good news.
Investors' reactions to the comments were also manifested in their valuation judgments.
Interestingly, when the disclosed news was bad, the investors' reactions were significantly weaker when all of the comments were positive, as opposed to when the comments were all negative or when there were no comments. Most importantly, the asymmetry between the reactions to good and bad news was eliminated when comments were attached to the disclosures.
This result is contrary to the findings of (Kothari, Wysocki and Shu [2009], Skinner [1994] ), and showed the power that comments have on investors' judgment and decision-making. The results indicate that the SEC may need to revisit the guidance regarding the use of social media channels for financial disclosures. While the disclosure itself falls under the guidance, the attached disclosures do not. However, management can manipulate the comments and the comments do influence investors' judgment and decision-making. In particular, guidance is needed on whether comments should be allowed to be attached to posts, thus removing the issue of social media as a three-way communication channel where the investors' stated viewpoint can be manipulated by management. 
